THE BOLLYWOOD MONOPOLY BREAKER - Why Modi’s CBFC Shake-Up Could Be Bigger Than It Looks

The Bollywood Monopoly Breaker — Modi’s CBFC shake-up, film distribution gatekeeping and competition in Indian cinema.

 

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THE BOLLYWOOD MONOPOLY BREAKER

Why Modi’s CBFC Shake-Up Could Be Bigger Than It Looks

Bollywood celebrates outsiders when they succeed. It turns their struggles into screenplays, their rejection into motivation, and their eventual triumph into box-office entertainment. But there is a question the industry rarely asks itself: what happens to the outsider who never gets through the door?

What happens to the filmmaker who cannot secure financing, the actor without influential connections, the producer who cannot obtain distribution, or the story that never receives enough screens to find its audience? Was the film rejected by the public—or was it denied a meaningful opportunity to reach the public in the first place?

That is not a trivial distinction. It is the difference between a competitive market and a market in which access can become more important than talent.

The Modi government's reconstitution of the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) on 16 September 2026 may appear to be an administrative reshuffle. A new board is announced, familiar names attract attention, and the industry returns to business as usual. But the decision creates an opportunity to examine a larger question: who holds power over Indian cinema, how is that power exercised, and how difficult is it for newcomers to challenge the established order?

The government's decision deserves recognition as an institutional intervention. Yet its significance will ultimately depend on what follows.

The CBFC shake-up will not, by itself, dismantle Bollywood's commercial power. But it gives us an opportunity to ask why the gates of Indian cinema have remained such consequential instruments of power—and whether those gates are genuinely open to everyone.

THE INDUSTRY THAT SELLS DREAMS AND RATIONS OPPORTUNITY

Bollywood's favourite protagonist is the underdog. The young man from a small town, the struggling performer, the individual who defeats privilege through determination: these characters are familiar because their stories resonate with audiences across India.

But the film industry is not a film. It is a chain of commercial decisions made long before the first ticket is sold.

A script needs financing. A production needs investors, talent and infrastructure. A completed film needs distribution, exhibition, marketing and an audience. Each stage presents a legitimate business challenge, but each can also become a barrier for people who lack established relationships or sufficient capital.

An unknown filmmaker may have a compelling screenplay and no route to a producer. An independent production house may complete a film but struggle to secure theatrical distribution. A regional story may have an audience waiting for it but receive insufficient visibility to reach that audience. Meanwhile, a project backed by established commercial relationships may enter the marketplace with a substantial head start.

None of these circumstances automatically proves discrimination. Investors must assess risk, distributors must make commercial choices, and no filmmaker has an automatic right to a theatrical release. But the legitimacy of individual business decisions does not eliminate the need to examine the structure in which those decisions occur.

When the ability to compete depends excessively on access to the people who control the route to market, merit can become secondary to permission.

That is the question Bollywood must confront. The success of a few outsiders proves that the door can open. It does not establish how many others were unable to reach it.

THE MONOPOLY THAT DOES NOT NEED A SINGLE OWNER

The word monopoly often conjures up an image of one company controlling an entire market. In a complex industry, however, barriers to entry can emerge from the combined effect of many different decisions without a single organisation controlling everything.

Financing may be concentrated among established investors. Distribution may depend on a limited set of commercial relationships. Exhibition opportunities may be shaped by bargaining power and screen availability. Marketing may reward those who can spend heavily. Industry associations may influence the terms on which participants work with one another.

The resulting system need not be centrally coordinated to create unequal opportunities.

This is why the debate about Bollywood should move beyond the familiar argument over star children and outsiders. Nepotism is visible. Structural barriers are less so. They can be embedded in contracts, commercial incentives, access to distribution networks and the economics of releasing a film.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has examined precisely these questions in its Market Study on the Film Distribution Chain in India, published on 14 October 2022. The study investigated competition across the Hindi, Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam film industries, including barriers to entry, bargaining-power imbalances, distribution arrangements and the effects of relationships between producers, distributors and exhibitors. It drew on consultations with 65 industry stakeholders and experts.

This is important because it moves the debate from rumour to institutional scrutiny. India's competition regulator considered whether the commercial architecture of film distribution could hinder competition and make life more difficult for smaller participants.

The study does not establish that a single Bollywood faction controls the industry. It does establish that questions about market access, bargaining power and restrictive practices are legitimate subjects for examination.

And the most revealing evidence comes from actual competition disputes.

THE CASE STUDY BOLLYWOOD CANNOT IGNORE: WHEN DISTRIBUTION BECOMES A BARRIER

Consider the dispute between Cinemax and the Film Distributors Association (FDA), involving the distribution and exhibition of Malayalam films.

As recorded in the CCI's 2022 market study, Cinemax alleged that the association was acting as a cartel in deciding the rates at which Malayalam films would be supplied for exhibition. The concern was not merely about the price of a film. Cinemax argued that such conduct could undermine competition among distributors, harm other exhibitors and ultimately affect consumers.

The CCI's account records a consequential finding: the Commission found that the FDA's unilateral increase in prices violated Sections 3(1), 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002.

This is not an allegation borrowed from social media. It is a competition-law finding documented by the regulator in its official study.

The case matters because it demonstrates how commercial power in cinema can extend beyond the glamorous world of casting and celebrity. Decisions about the terms on which films are supplied for exhibition can affect the ability of businesses to compete. Distribution is not a peripheral service that comes after the creative work is complete. It is part of the machinery through which a film reaches its audience.

When that machinery becomes subject to restrictive conduct, the consequences can extend beyond the immediate parties to the dispute.

There is an important qualification: this case concerned Malayalam film distribution, not proof of a Hindi-film cartel or a conspiracy controlling Bollywood. Its relevance is structural. It demonstrates that exclusionary or anti-competitive conduct in the wider Indian film ecosystem is not merely a theoretical concern.

The CCI's report also discusses a separate dispute involving the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry's multiplex association and the United Producers/Distributors Forum. The regulator recorded that it had found cartel-like behaviour by the latter in an effort to make exhibitors accept its demands over box-office revenue sharing. The report further discusses competition concerns involving association membership, boycotts and restrictions on dealing with non-members.

The lesson is uncomfortable but clear: industry relationships can serve legitimate purposes, including coordination and dispute resolution, yet they can also become instruments of exclusion when participants use collective power to restrict competition.

That is why the question of access cannot be reduced to whether a producer knows a star or a director has the right surname. The deeper question is whether the commercial route from production to audience remains open to meaningful competition.

A film can be blocked from opportunity without anyone ever announcing that the filmmaker is unwelcome. Sometimes the decisive barrier lies in the terms, relationships and market structures through which the film must travel.

FOLLOW THE SCREENS: WHERE COMMERCIAL POWER BECOMES VISIBLE

The CCI's study offers another revealing piece of evidence. It reported that, at the time of the study, three major entities accounted for approximately 79 per cent of India's multiplex screens. The report also noted that the concentration of theatrical exhibition left producers with fewer channels through which to monetise their films, giving downstream players greater bargaining power because they controlled access to those channels.

The figure must be read in its proper historical context: it describes the market position reported in a 2022 study, drawing on earlier data, and should not be presented as a verified measure of the market in 2026. Nor does screen concentration alone establish unlawful conduct. Multiplex chains can grow through investment, efficiency and consumer demand.

But the underlying economic question remains powerful. When a relatively small number of exhibition companies control a substantial share of theatrical access, how much negotiating leverage does a small producer possess?

The CCI's study recorded stakeholder concerns about revenue-sharing terms, promotional costs and the discretion exercised over screen and show allocation. Producers reported that multiplex terms could be difficult to negotiate and that promotional expenditure created barriers for smaller production houses. These were stakeholder findings in a market study, not a legal determination that every such practice was unlawful.

The distinction matters. A multiplex must allocate screens according to commercial realities. Demand fluctuates, films compete for limited slots, and exhibition businesses must remain viable. The problem is not that commercial decisions exist. The problem arises if the structure of the market leaves smaller participants with persistently weaker bargaining power or if restrictive conduct prevents them from competing.

Imagine an independent producer who has financed a film without a major studio behind it. The production is complete. The film has passed certification. The filmmaker now needs distribution, publicity and theatrical access. If those arrangements are too expensive, too difficult to negotiate or dependent on a narrow network of intermediaries, the legal right to make a film may mean very little in commercial practice.

A certificate does not sell tickets. A completed film does not automatically secure screens. And a talented newcomer cannot compete with a film the audience never gets a reasonable chance to discover.

This is the gatekeeping problem in its most concrete form: the power to make a film and the power to reach an audience are two different things.

THE COYOTE, THE BOX OFFICE AND THE NARRATIVE MACHINE

This is also the larger question behind our earlier editorial, CHAUHAAN IS COMING. THE COYOTE NEVER LEARNS. (Narrative Gatekeepers vs. The Box Office).

The argument was not simply that a particular film or personality might succeed against expectations. It was about the limits of the industry's ability to predict what audiences will accept—and the danger of confusing established commercial assumptions with the preferences of the public.

The box office is not a perfect measure of artistic merit. A hit is not automatically a masterpiece, and a flop is not automatically the victim of a conspiracy. But audience response can challenge the certainty of gatekeepers who believe they know which stories will work, which performers are marketable and which filmmakers deserve investment.

That is where the distribution evidence becomes relevant. If commercial access is uneven, a film's failure to reach a large audience cannot always be treated as a clean verdict on its artistic or commercial potential. The audience may have rejected the film—or the film may never have received sufficient exposure for a meaningful test.

This does not mean every overlooked film would have succeeded with a wider release. It means that the conditions under which films compete deserve scrutiny.

Who decides which stories receive investment before the audience has seen them? Who determines whether a newcomer is commercially viable before that newcomer has been given a serious opportunity? How often do the same established networks influence financing, distribution, publicity and exhibition?

These are questions for evidence-led investigation, not assumptions to be treated as proven facts. But the CCI's documented findings show why they cannot simply be dismissed as resentment from people who failed to succeed.

The industry should welcome scrutiny of the system that determines access to audiences. If the system is competitive, evidence will help demonstrate it. If it is not, the same evidence may reveal where reform is needed.

ENTER THE CBFC: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL MOMENT

On 16 September 2026, the Government of India reconstituted the Central Board of Film Certification with 18 members for a term of three years or until further orders, whichever is earlier. The new board includes figures from different parts of India's cultural and entertainment landscape. The official notification is available here.

The significance of the decision should neither be exaggerated nor dismissed.

The CBFC does not determine which producer receives investment, which distributor acquires a film or how many screens a multiplex allocates. It cannot, by changing its membership, dismantle commercial concentration across the film industry. To claim otherwise would confuse certification with competition policy.

But the CBFC occupies an important institutional position. Its decisions affect the certification process and, consequently, a film's route to release. Its composition, procedures and consistency therefore matter.

A reconstituted board creates an opportunity to examine whether certification decisions are professionally defensible, procedurally fair and transparent. It creates an opportunity to strengthen public confidence in the institution and to ensure that its responsibilities are exercised according to clear standards.

That is a legitimate reason to recognise the government's decision as a meaningful institutional change.

The harder question is what happens beyond the CBFC. If the concern is unequal commercial access, then the response must extend to the appropriate competition and regulatory mechanisms. Documented allegations of restrictive conduct belong before the institutions equipped to examine contracts, market power and evidence—not in a certification board's remit.

The government deserves credit for the institutional change it has made. Whether that change becomes part of a broader reform of the film ecosystem remains to be demonstrated.

THE MONOPOLY TEST

Bollywood should be willing to answer a straightforward set of questions.

Can an unknown filmmaker with a strong script obtain serious consideration without established connections? Can an independent producer negotiate distribution on commercially reasonable terms? Can a small film compete for meaningful exhibition opportunities against heavily promoted releases? Can industry associations protect legitimate professional interests without restricting competition? Can the terms of access to screens, promotion and distribution be examined transparently?

These questions do not presume that every newcomer has been unfairly treated. They do not demand guaranteed success or equal screen time for every film. They ask whether genuine competition exists—and whether barriers that cannot be justified by legitimate commercial considerations are being allowed to persist.

The CCI's work gives this debate an evidentiary foundation. Its documented account of the Malayalam distribution dispute shows that anti-competitive conduct can arise in the supply of films for exhibition. Its analysis of multiplex concentration and bargaining power explains why control over access can matter. Its discussion of association practices shows why collective industry relationships require appropriate competition safeguards.

These findings do not prove a single, coordinated Bollywood monopoly. They establish something more precise and useful: parts of India's film-distribution ecosystem have faced documented competition problems, and the structure of access warrants continued scrutiny.

That is enough to justify a serious reform agenda. It is not necessary to invent a conspiracy when the documented evidence already raises substantial questions.

The test must apply to the government as well. A new CBFC board should be judged by its procedures and decisions, not simply by the names on its membership list. Any wider claim of reform should be measured by improvements in transparency, fair access and accountability across the relevant institutions and markets.

Changing the faces at one gate is not the same as opening every gate.

THE GATE MUST OPEN

India's cinematic imagination is much larger than Mumbai's established commercial networks. Its storytellers come from regional industries, small towns, independent production houses, theatre groups and communities whose experiences may never have been considered commercially fashionable.

Their right to compete does not mean every film deserves financing, every story deserves a wide release or every newcomer deserves a successful career. It means that opportunity should not depend disproportionately on access to a narrow set of relationships or on restrictive practices that prevent genuine competition.

That is the difference between a competitive industry and a closed ecosystem.

The Modi government's CBFC reconstitution offers an opportunity to insist on stronger institutional accountability. But the larger challenge lies beyond the boardroom. India's film ecosystem must be willing to examine how financing, distribution, exhibition and industry associations shape the path from a creator's imagination to an audience's screen.

The CCI has already documented why that examination matters. The next step is not to turn those findings into sweeping accusations about every filmmaker or every studio. It is to use them as a starting point for transparent, evidence-based scrutiny of the practices that determine access.

Bollywood can remain commercially successful while becoming more open to competition. Established studios can protect their investments without treating existing relationships as the only reliable route to market. Exhibitors can make rational commercial choices while remaining subject to legitimate competition safeguards. Public institutions can perform their duties without becoming instruments of either commercial influence or political preference.

The objective is not to replace one set of gatekeepers with another. It is to ensure that the gates themselves cannot become permanent barriers to competition.

Bollywood does not own India's cinematic imagination. It does not own the audience. It does not own the future of Indian storytelling.

The government has changed the composition of one important institution. The competition regulator has documented problems elsewhere in the film-distribution chain. The question now is whether the industry is prepared to confront the structures that stand between talent and opportunity.

WILL BOLLYWOOD OPEN ITS GATES—or will it continue to celebrate the outsider only after that outsider has somehow survived being kept outside?

That is the test. And this time, the audience should not be the only one expected to pass it.

SOURCES AND FURTHER READING

1. Government of India
CBFC reconstitution notification, 16 September 2026

2. Competition Commission of India
Market Study on the Film Distribution Chain in India, 2022

3. Press Information Bureau
Official summary of the CCI market study

By: Manish Kumar, Founder & Editor, Explain It Clearly

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